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Investigating the ‘Science’ in ‘Eastern Religions’: 
A methodological inquiry 
 
The trope of ‘science and religion’ is usually employed in western academic circles as a 
shorthand for the historical narratives and the philosophical analyses of the various overlaps, 
oppositions, and disjunctions between empirical scientific methodologies and specifically 
Christian doctrines of God, creation, and redemption. Over the last five decades or so, the key 
terms ‘science’ and ‘religion’, understood in terms of these referents, have been minutely 
scrutinised, and various typologies of the relations, some more amicable than the others, 
between these categories have been proposed. More recently, the rubric of ‘Eastern 
Religions’ has sometimes been added to these discussions, where this category encompasses 
diverse spiritual strands which have received varying degrees of scholarly attention. The 
engagements of Tibetan Mahayana Buddhisms with quantum physics and neurobiology have 
been quite extensively studied, and various interpretations of the empirical sciences have 
been offered also from certain Hindu Vedantic perspectives. From a historical perspective, 
there is a conceptual-institutional divergence between the discourses of ‘science and 
Christianity’ and of ‘science and eastern religions’, in that while European science and 
Christianity emerged from a common intellectual and institutional matrix of post-
Reformation cultures, and were thus crucially shaped by their mutual borrowings and 
hostilities, European science is a more recent arrival in various parts of south Asia, often in 
circumstances shaped by colonial power. While ‘science’ and ‘religion’ can be definitionally 
imprecise in some European contexts, these terms arguably become even more semantically 
nebulous in some non-western contexts. We shall explore in this essay some of the 
understandings of ‘science’ that are deployed in the literature on ‘science and eastern 
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religions’, for it is these understandings that crucially shape the raging debates between the 
avid proponents and the keen detractors of the thesis that eastern forms of spirituality are 
uniquely able to subsume the sciences into their metaphysical-axiological horizons. More 
specifically, we shall explore some of the proposed relations between ‘science’ and ‘eastern 
religions’ by highlighting three themes: (a) the relation between science and metaphysics, (b) 
the relation between science and experience, and (c) the European origins of science. We will 
note that under (a) and (b), it is often claimed that the methodologies of the empirical 
sciences currently lack ontological foundations, which can be supplied by certain (supra-
)experientialist types of eastern spiritualities. A somewhat different style of intervention (c) 
into these debates is that science is merely a parochial western knowledge system, so that it 
should either be rejected altogether or chastened by integrating some of its aspects into 
eastern spiritualities. The analysis of these claims requires a methodological inquiry into 
some of the culturally freighted valences of ‘science’, ‘metaphysics’, and ‘experience’. 
 
Science and Metaphysics 
 
A fundamental debate in current philosophy of science is whether the scientific enterprise is 
self-explanatory or whether it requires certain extra-scientific (‘metaphysical’) justifications. 
Those who argue for the latter view state that the scientific enterprise is based on some 
conceptual presuppositions which cannot be provided by or defended from its own 
methodological resources. For instance, scientists in their everyday theorising and 
observations presuppose the truth of certain propositions such as these: the structures of 
reality are rationally comprehensible, certain natural patterns are (relatively) uniform and 
invariant, the ‘external’ world is logically independent of the mind, and so on. However, 
these propositions are strictly speaking extra-scientific, in that they do not figure as 
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observational premises or data of scientific theories. The fact that it would be psychologically 
difficult (if not impossible) for a scientist who believes that deep reality is fundamentally 
inscrutable and chaotic to conduct specific lines of scientific inquiry should be taken as 
suggesting, according to this view, that such deep uniformity is an (unexamined) extra-
scientific condition of the possibility of everyday science. Such a proposed move from 
science to its metaphysical foundations would have been resisted by the logical positivists, 
for whom a statement is meaningful only if it is verifiable through human experience. 
Consequently, all statements which are not subject to verification, either in fact or in principle 
(such as ‘all deep reality is rationally explicable’), should be dismissed as metaphysical and 
literally nonsensical. The scientific enterprise, in particular, only outlines empirical patterns 
and uses them to make predictions, without appealing to non-observable theoretical entities. 
The alleged ‘depths’ of metaphysical reasoning are therefore to be rejected, for as R. Carnap, 
O. Hahn, and M. Neurath argued: ‘In science there are no ‘depths’; there is surface 
everywhere’ (Neurath and Cohen 1973: 306). More recent decades, however, have witnessed 
a revival, among some philosophers of science, of a certain kind of metaphysics, where 
metaphysical enquiries are not dismissed, by definition, as meaningless, provided they are 
circumscribed by the empirical results of the sciences. Metaphysics, on this view, would be 
‘naturalised’ in the sense that it would seek not to develop grand ontologies but to unify into 
conceptual systems the various hypotheses and theories which are offered by contemporary 
science. Therefore, metaphysics understood in traditional terms as a search for the basic 
structures of reality can be retained, so long as this inquiry is not based on a priori reasoning, 
speculative thinking, or intuitions, but is informed by the empirical content provided by 
science (Ross, Ladyman and Kincaid 2013). 
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The ‘naturalization’ proposed for metaphysics has also been attempted for various fields 
ranging from epistemology to ethics, where it is claimed that purely ‘naturalist’ descriptions 
can be provided for their contents (Gasser 2007). While ‘naturalism’ has turned out to be 
difficult to define with precision, one negative understanding is the view that ‘reality consists 
solely of the physical, spatio-temporal world’ (Smith 2012:1). That is, ‘naturalism’, 
according to O. Flanagan, is (minimally) opposed to ‘supernaturalism’, which states that (i) 
there are super-natural entities ‘outside’ the natural world, (ii) which are in causal interaction 
with the world, (iii) though there are no reliable epistemic means for justifying belief in these 
entities or in this interaction. However, philosophers who endorse forms of ontological 
naturalism often disagree about precisely what it excludes – some naturalists accept the 
existence of numbers, meanings, universals, and so on. Thus, noting that ontological 
naturalism is the view that ‘for all we know and can know’ the natural world is the totality of 
what there is, Flanagan (2006: 438) argues that the notion of the ‘natural’ is somewhat vague, 
and ‘the central concept in the motto lacks a clear and determinate meaning’. 
Notwithstanding this ambiguity, ontological naturalists tend to view the self, free agency, 
intentionality, and so on as ultimately properties of complex physical systems. Closely related 
to this position is ‘scientism’ which is the view that science supplies the correct and the most 
complete description of these systems, because everything is made up of the basic kinds of 
things that are catalogued by science (Rosenberg 2011). Because science is our only means of 
access to reality, beliefs which can be rationally held are those which can be scientifically 
established, and the only reality we can meaningfully speak about is the one that science 
investigates. For instance, the so-called mystery of consciousness is not quite an enigma, for 
all mental phenomena can ultimately be reduced – both explanatorily and ontologically – to 
the entities and the categories employed in physical theories (Crick 1994:3). The fundamental 
debate in this context is whether ontological naturalism – the metaphysical stance that only 
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those entities which can be unearthed through the tools of the empirical scientific disciplines 
are to be accorded reality – is logically necessitated by scientific methodology or is an extra-
scientific (‘metaphysical’) claim. Scientism’s claim that there is no question which in 
principle cannot be answered by science and that the only rationally justifiable beliefs about 
reality are the ones that are accepted within science would place it at loggerheads with most 
religious views. R. Trigg (2015: 35) argues, however, that this is a ‘global claim going far 
beyond the remit of science. Those who make it have to stand outside all science and make a 
judgement about its scope’. According to Trigg, the view that the entities that turn up in a 
scientific ontology exhaust ‘reality’ is a metaphysical claim which cannot be justified from 
within science.  
 
The significance of these debates over ‘what there is’ for our purposes is this: thinkers from 
various Hindu and Buddhist universes have claimed that these operate with notions of 
‘naturalism’ which do not equate with ‘reality’ only those entities that are enumerated in 
scientific classifications. Developing this theme from a Hindu perspective, S. Menon 
(2006:11) argues: ‘Reason and experiments are … not the only valid means of knowing. 
Depending on the domain of study, reflection, inner transformation, and ontological insights 
also are means of knowledge … The Truth that was pursued demanded a means that is a 
blend of personal and social engagement, ecological awareness, and advanced mathematics’. 
Similarly, arguing that there are experiential aspects of human existence which cannot be 
circumscribed by syllogistic arguments, V.V. Raman (1997:18) writes that ‘there is often an 
eagerness to find scientific support for trans-rational matters also. It is futile and irrelevant to 
look for scientific buttressing for them … Vedāntic vision belongs to the trans-rational 
category’. 
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B.A. Wallace argues, in this vein, that Buddhism is a form of naturalism that seeks to develop 
hypotheses about the mind and its relation to the natural environment. Wallace argues that  
these have been experientially confirmed in the Buddhist traditions over the last 2,500 years 
with the help of meditative techniques which are duplicable by trained individuals. The 
Buddhist claim that underlying the individual mind, there is a continuum of awareness that 
precedes the present life and continues after death (ālayavijñāna) can be tested by Buddhist 
contemplatives, by undergoing training in deep meditative calm (samādhi) which might take 
up to 20,000 hours. This mental continuum can be accessed not through the quantitative, 
externalist, and objective tools of science but through the first-person meditative methods 
which are outlined in the Buddhist traditions: ‘Just as the existence of the moons of Jupiter 
can be verified only by those who gaze through a telescope, so the existence of subtle 
dimensions of consciousness can be verified experientially only by those willing to devote 
themselves to years of rigorous attentional training’ (Wallace 2006:36). However, a crucial 
difference between science and Buddhist naturalism is that while the former attributes causal 
powers only to objectifiable and quantifiable physical phenomena, the latter also includes 
mental phenomena in its understanding of the structures of empirical reality (Wallace 2003: 
8). Therefore, on the one hand, Buddhism has scientific credentials in that individuals have to 
be socialised into Buddhist paradigms of meditative practices before they can have 
experiential verification of Buddhist truths. Just as scientists do not individually test every 
hypothesis, but have to depend on complex networks of trust, Buddhist meditation too is 
carried out within institutional and conceptual systems. On the other hand, these Buddhist 
truths relating to a non-physical continuum of cognitions presuppose an ontology that is 
wider than is available in many current versions of naturalism. The significance of these 
metaphysical disputes is highlighted by the following observation of T. Jinpa on some 
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contemporary Buddhist dialogues with western science: ‘Scientists who engage with Tibetan 
scholars notice how questions immediately turn to the theoretical and philosophical 
implications of specific scientific views rather than focusing on the details of the content of a 
particular concept’ (Jinpa 2010: 878). These two distinct forms of enquiries also structure, 
according Jinpa, the Dalai Lama’s own engagements with science. First, on matters such as 
the understanding of the emotions or the implications of quantum physics, the emphasis is on 
science and Buddhism as two ‘investigative traditions’ that can collaborate to increase human 
knowledge and promote human well-being. At this level, the ‘more metaphysical aspects of 
the two traditions – the concepts of rebirth, karma, and the possibility of full enlightenment of 
Buddhism; and physicalism, reductionism, and the causal closure principle on the part of the 
scientific worldview – are left bracketed’ (Jinpa 2010: 876–77). The second dimension is 
specifically relevant to the reformulation of traditional Buddhism, and consists of 
incorporating aspects of the scientific worldview which have been empirically tested, and 
responding to challenges posed by this worldview to Buddhist doctrines. As a result of the 
interweaving of these layers, when western scientists enter into dialogue with Tibetan 
Buddhism, which ties together Nagarjuna’s teachings on emptiness (sunyata), rich 
Abhidharma taxonomies of types of mental events, and compassion as the central ethical 
value, they engage with a ‘complex yet integrative tradition, which defies any modern 
categories of philosophy, religion and science …’ (Jinpa 2010:875). 
 
Regarding the first of these levels, the Dalai Lama writes that Einstein’s theory of relativity 
has given him an empirical texture for his understanding of Nāgārjuna’s notion of emptiness, 
the behaviour of quantum entities has highlighted the Buddha’s teaching of transience, and 
the discovery of the genome points to the Buddhist view of the fundamental equality of all 
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beings (Dalai Lama 2005: 206). Both Buddhism and science also share a fundamental 
methodological attitude of continuing to search for reality through empirical means, and 
discarding firmly-held positions if these are found to be false. He notes that the Buddha 
himself exhorted his disciples not to follow his teachings merely on the basis of reverence to 
him, but to test them through ‘reasoned examination and personal experiment’ (2005: 24). He 
even claims that ‘if scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in 
Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims’ 
(2005:3). However, at the second level of the defense of Buddhist standpoints relating to 
rebirth and the cultivation of compassion, the Dalai Lama argues that certain deep truths are 
not accessible to those without scriptural testimony: ‘From the Buddhist point of view, there 
is a further level of reality, which may remain obscure to the unenlightened mind. 
Traditionally, a typical illustration of this would be the most subtle workings of the law of 
karma … Only in this category of propositions is scripture cited as a potentially correct 
source of authority, on the specific basis that for Buddhists, the testimony of the Buddha has 
proven to be reliable in the examination of the nature of existence and the path to liberation’ 
(2005:28). From the perspective of Buddhist enlightenment, one would reject the neo-
Darwinian view that biological mutations are purely random events, or forms of physicalism 
that would reduce mental events to materiality. For the Dalai Lama, the opposition here is not 
between two varieties of empirical statements but two metaphysical stances: ‘From the 
scientific view, the theory of karma may be a metaphysical assumption – but it is no more so 
than the assumption that all of life is material and originated out of pure chance’ (2005:110). 
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Science and Experience 
 
If the debate over ‘science’ in Eastern religions or Eastern mysticism (the categories often 
employed in the literature to refer to spiritual systems of Indic or Chinese origins) is thus 
partly over whether or not science is logically connected to ontological naturalism or 
scientism, it is also partly over the role of experience in the scientific enterprise. A significant 
amount of the literature on science and eastern mysticism is based on the claim that the ‘new 
physics’, which has supposedly re-introduced the observer into the heart of scientific theory, 
can be readily aligned with ‘eastern mysticism’ which is said to have foregrounded the role of 
experience, mind, or consciousness in constituting physical realities. The views of the eastern 
mystics on the phenomenality of space, time, causation, and so on are often said to parallel 
modern physics. These claims touch on the intensely debated philosophical theme, especially 
between K. Popper and T.S. Kuhn, of the relationship between ‘theory’ and ‘experience’ in 
science. On the one hand, science is not purely an empiricist accumulation of data: Popper 
(2002: 16) criticised the ‘bucket theory’ of the mind, which views humans as largely passive 
in receiving data which is then used to formulate hypotheses and deduce theories, on the 
grounds that it obscures the active role of the mind in framing speculative (‘metaphysical’) 
hypotheses, some of which have aided the development of scientific theories. The Popperian 
emphasis on speculative thinking is reflected in the following claim by J. Hartle and M. 
Srednicki: ‘The course of physics, both theoretically and experimentally, is guided by 
prejudice as to the nature of the theory sought for. We favor theories that are simple, 
beautiful, precisely formulable mathematically, economical in their assumptions, 
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comprehensive, unifying, explanatory, accessible to existing intuition, etc. Most importantly 
we favor theories that are successful in predicting new data beyond what we have at the 
moment. The bases for such prejudices do not lie in logic but rather previous experience with 
constructing successful theories’. On the other hand, science is not simply a system of 
abstract ideas connected through logical structures and mathematical formulations, for the 
physical universe cannot be spun out of conceptual entailments. Rather, the contingent data 
that the physical sciences work with – the birth of stars, falling apples, and shifting tides – 
has to be formulated into mathematical equations of (arguably) unvarying laws. However, the 
question of the relative significance of conceptual elegance versus experimental testability in 
a scientific theory remains a disputed matter: for instance, string theory, which was 
developed to unify the theory of general relativity and quantum mechanics, has often been 
criticised on the grounds that it is yet to make predictions which can be experimentally tested. 
However, Brian Greene defends string theory in terms of certain theoretical virtues: ‘In a 
single framework, it handles the domains claimed by relativity and the quantum. Moreover, 
… string theory does so in a manner that fully embraces all the discoveries that preceded it’ 
(Greene 2011:94).
 
 As critics of Popper have noted, when a theory comes up against 
recalcitrant data, it is not conclusively rejected straightaway. Rather, if the theory is able to 
explain other sets of data reasonably well, it is allowed to stand in the absence of a better 
theory (Lakatos 1970:173).  
 
The basic questions underlying the literature on ‘quantum mysticism’, then, are these: (i) 
whether quantum physics indeed repositions the observer in the role of ‘constituting’ reality 
through experience, spirit, or consciousness, and (ii) whether a certain form of eastern 
mysticism provides the theoretical support for the empirical claims of quantum physics on an 
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interpretation that provides an affirmative response to (i) (Goswami 2001).
 
According to the 
so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, uncertainty, indeterminacy, and 
probability are objective or intrinsic features of quantum phenomena, and not merely 
epistemic features of our lack of knowledge. Further, a quantum system is completely 
described by a mathematical wave-function which is a ‘superposition’ of several possible 
outcomes, and the measurement interaction between this system and a macroscopic detector 
‘collapses’ or ‘reduces’ the wave-function to one determinate outcome. However, there is no 
consensus among scientists about this so-called measurement problem: there are several 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which produce the same experimental results, so that 
they differ only in their metaphysical implications (Omnès 1994). According to the 
multiverse interpretation, all the different possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are 
actualised, but in different parallel universes. Some idealist interpretations of quantum 
mechanics argue that it is human consciousness which constitutes reality, by ‘collapsing’ the 
wave-functions, so that the human observer and what is being observed become co-
constituting elements (Wheeler 1977). One possibility here is that while physical properties 
such as position, momentum, charge and so on exist in indeterminate states of 
‘superpositions’, mental states, because they are distinct from brain states, can ‘collapse’ 
these wave functions (Halvorson 2011). According to an instrumentalist approach, however, 
the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics should be seen merely as predictive or 
calculational tools, which do not give us any insights into the deep structures of reality. 
 
However, contemporary Hindu writers on quantum physics often highlight the idealistic 
interpretations, and correlate these with certain readings of the classical Vedantic system of 
Advaita, according to which Brahman is the timeless, indivisible, and formless ground of all 
phenomenal reality which is insubstantial (māyā). Thus Swami Jitatmananda (2006:2) argues 
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that physicists are being led towards a vision of unification, not only of the four fundamental 
physical forces, but also of subject and object by scientific experimental results: ‘A scientist 
is no more a detached observer but is an active participator in the very processes of his 
experimentation. Physics has already entered the areas of Eastern mysticism’.  He presents 
the Advaitic doctrines as teaching that the phenomenal world is a deeply interconnected 
reality, in which to search for an isolated and independent entity such as an electron is a 
misconception (māyā). Similarly, N.C. Panda (1991: 306–307) argues that at the microscopic 
dimensions we are dealing not with reality-itself but with probabilities or mathematical wave-
functions which are our cognitive constructions. Therefore, quantum physics employs the 
word ‘participator’ rather than ‘observer’, since to some degree we create the reality that we 
interact with. Because the subatomic particles are not substantively real but are products of 
human interactions with deep reality, he concludes: ‘Both quantum physicists and the non-
dualistic philosophers of Advaita Vedānta agree on the point that the world is an illusion’ 
(1991: 336). However, whether quantum physicists themselves have endorsed such 
metaphysical implications is a deeply contested matter. While Einstein and Max Planck 
vigorously resisted the notion that the physical world is dependent on the human mind, other 
founding figures such as Wolfgang Pauli and Erwin Schrodinger, both of whom incidentally 
had been influenced by Schopenhauer, were more willing to speak of consciousness within 
the framework of quantum mechanics. (Marin 2009)
.
 However, regarding E. Wigner’s 
proposal that it is the human observer as a conscious being who ‘collapses’ the wave-
function, E.R. Scerri (1989: 689–90) notes that this is ‘something of a minority view, despite 
Wigner’s eminence in the quantum world’. Further, the consciousness that Wigner speaks of 
is ordinary consciousness that operates through sensory channels, and not the deep meditative 
states of higher consciousness of some Indic mysticisms. A. Shimony provides a cautious 
route through these conceptual minefields by indicating that a solution to the ‘measurement 
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problem’ might involve radical restructurings of our understanding of physical reality, 
including, for instance, the attribution to consciousness the power to actualise specific 
possibilities. He notes: ‘Whatever the outcome of our present uncertainties may be, it is sure 
to be philosophically significant. Those who have deplored the rift between science and 
philosophy which began to develop in the eighteenth century may take comfort in the mutual 
relevance of these disciplines exhibited in the foundations of quantum mechanics’ (1989: 
395). 
 
Modern Advaitic visualizations of subatomic phenomena usually go significantly beyond this 
statement of ‘mutual relevance’ and argue that quantum physics is, in fact, deficient in that it 
cannot, in itself, lead individuals to the metaphysical absolute. Swami Jitatmananda argues 
that scientists cannot move beyond the boundary conditions of their physical equations, for 
the eternal substratum, Brahman can only be apprehended through a higher intuition which 
goes beyond reason but does not contradict reason (2006: 77). Panda argues, in this vein, that 
his primary goal is to develop a ‘fusion’ of Advaita Vedānta and quantum mechanics, where 
Advaita is reinterpreted in the light of modern science, and the ‘deficiencies of modern 
science have been made up by the supplementation of Advaita Vedānta’ (1991: xiv). The 
crucial claim underlying the positions of Swami Jitatmananda and Panda is this: while 
quantum physics can be a limited pointer towards the ‘things in themselves’, its theoretical 
formulations are largely confined to empirical entities and processes, and only Advaita 
Vedānta can truly direct individuals towards the transcendental Brahman which underlies the 
phenomenal world. In other words, the proposed correlations between certain aspects of 
quantum mechanics and modernised configurations of Advaita, for instance, the deep 
entanglement across quantum phenomena and the Advaitic notion of an undifferentiated 
unity, are being offered from the transcendental vantage-point of the eternal Brahman.  
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Therefore, the ‘science’ in modernised Advaita Vedānta is to be understood ultimately in 
terms of an Upaniṣad-based gnosis of one’s deep non-duality (advaita) with Brahman. This 
gnosis is often inflected, in the ‘neo-Advaita’ of Hindu figures such as Swami Vivekananda, 
with the vocabulary of ‘experience’ so as to present it as scientific. A. Rambachan has 
pointed out that Swami Vivekananda presented the Vedas to his western audiences as 
containing spiritual laws which were similar to the laws of nature. The Vedic scriptures are a 
repository of the spiritual experiences (anubhava) of gifted human beings, who are able to 
verify these laws through a direct apprehension and not a mere study of the texts (1994: 60). 
For instance, Swami Vivekananda notes that a scientist does not offer a statement to be 
accepted unless it has been tested by experience, and likewise the existence of the divine is 
grounded in direct perception: ‘The proof of this wall is that I perceive it. God has been 
perceived that way by thousands before …’ However, he acknowledges at once that what he 
has in mind here is a specific form of yogic consciousness: ‘But this perception is no sense-
perception at all; it is supersensuous, superconscious …’ (Vivekananda 1992: vol. 1, 415). S. 
Radhakrishnan, in a similar manner, often spoke of the ‘experimental basis’ of Hindu 
philosophy (darśana), which leads an individual to a direct insight (anubhava) into the nature 
of reality. A fundamental difference between Radhakrishnan and the classical systematiser of 
Advaita, Śaṃkara (c.800 CE) is that whereas the latter grounds the self-certifying nature of 
intuition (anubhava) ultimately in the authority of scripture and exegesis based on it, the 
former reverses this order of priority. Radhakrishnan instead argues that this ‘experience’, 
which provides its own justification and which does not, in addition, violate the canons of 
rationality or make appeals to unique revelations, is also found to conform to the Vedic 
scriptures. Radhakrishnan’s attempt to disjoin this mode of spiritual apprehension from 
scriptural tradition has been read in terms of his valorization of ‘science’ as providing 
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universal access to truth and of the authority of ‘experience’ over that of tradition 
(Forsthoefel 2002). Thus Radhakrishnan’s neo-Vedanta presents Hinduism as the religion 
based on the spiritual experiences of the Vedic seers as recorded in scripture, and these 
experiences have to be reconfirmed by individuals in their own consciousness. These Vedic 
truths are ‘capable of being re-experienced … By experimenting with different religious 
conceptions and relating them with the rest of our life, we can know the sound from the 
unsound’ (Radhakrishnan 1927: 15). The appropriation of certain scientific dimensions from 
Hindu metaphysical perspectives also structures several modern Vedantic engagements with 
neo-Darwinian evolution. The conflict between the non-teleological character of neo-
Darwinian evolution, which operates through random genetic mutation and natural selection, 
and the teleological emphasis of Hindu notions of spiritual progress is removed by positing 
the former as a biological means which can partly assist the perfection of the latter. A crucial 
distinction between the two is that in Vedantic metaphysical systems, the spirit 
(puruṣa/ātman) is the origin and the foundation in the spiritual evolution, and not the product, 
of the physical universe (Killingley 1990: 165). Therefore, some of the pivotal figures of 
modern Hinduism, such as Keshub Chandra Sen, Swami Vivekananda, Aurobindo and others 
were able to accept the organic evolution of Darwinism at a lower level of truth, by placing it 
below the higher level of the spiritual manifestation (‘evolution’) of humanity (Brown 2012: 
613). For instance, Swami Vivekananda argued that while westerners have their theory of 
evolution in terms of the survival of the fittest, the classical Indian yogis such as Patañjali had 
a superior understanding in terms of the refinement of material nature to allow the 
manifestation of the true self (Vivekananda 1992: vol.6, 45).  
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Science and its Metaphysical Foundations  
 
To summarise our argument so far, the question of whether the philosophical/experiential 
content of  Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta can be regarded as ‘scientific’ is 
related to ongoing disputes over whether or not the scientific enterprise is beset with some 
internal inadequacies which can be remedied by the metaphysical horizons of these eastern 
spiritualities.  
 
Christian theologians have sometimes claimed in this regard that scientific results 
underdetermine metaphysical theories, that is, more than one theory can incorporate these 
results. A theological reflection on the sciences can explain the gradual emergence of self-
conscious, personal and moral beings with the capacities for scientific inquiry and spiritual 
transformation. For instance, J. Polkinghorne writes that various contemporary disciplines 
such as cosmology and the biological sciences often throw up questions which are not 
properly scientific but meta-scientific, and he offers a ‘theology of nature’ as one such meta-
interpretation of the world that is disclosed to us through these disciplines. While ‘natural 
theology’ sought to argue deductively from certain features of the world to God, a ‘theology 
of nature’ is instead a theistic exploration, in the light of divine revelation, of how the 
creative purposes are being worked out through the complexities of the evolving universe 
(Polkinghorne 1998: 77–78). The basic theme here is that Christian doctrine can provide 
certain kinds of ‘confirmation’ for scientific theories: for instance, Christian theologians 
might argue that the doctrine of a creator God helps to make sense of the existence of a stable 
rational order that the scientific disciplines seek to investigate (Stenmark 2010: 282–84). The 
key challenge in these theological investigations into the foundations of the natural sciences 
is to spell out the relations between scientific inquiry and Christian doctrine such that the 
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latter illuminates the former without violating its cognitive autonomy and methodological 
integrity. More precisely, the challenge is to negotiate possible oppositions, contradictions or 
conflicts between these two domains, so that the results of science are somehow seen as a 
reflection of the creator in the natural world (Barbour 2000). Consider, for instance, the three 
models of divine action, discussed by A. Jackelén, which do not involve God’s direct 
intervention in natural causal processes. First, there is the deistic picture of God who creates 
the world but is not continuously involved in its sustenance. According to the second, God 
works through primary causality at a level which is distinct from the level of secondary 
causality which operates across natural phenomena. Jackelén notes that while scientists 
cannot disprove the existence of primary causality, it is irrelevant to their understanding of 
natural phenomena. Third, a set of models which she labels ‘entangled divine action’ places 
God within the framework of an indeterministic natural web that is studied by the sciences 
such as quantum physics and evolutionary biology. However, even these approaches 
ultimately result ‘in an ambiguous openness: The eye of faith may see final causality, that is, 
ultimate purposes that pull the cosmos towards its final telos, and science can neither confirm 
nor deny such claims’ (Jackelén 2012: 141). In other words, the move from the natural 
sciences to a Christian theological reflection on these sciences is not a ‘deductive step’; 
rather, it is from the perspective of Christian faith that one may begin to see the natural world 
as imprinted with signs of divine presence.  
 
Some of these conceptual problems also emerge in the contemporary Hindu attempts to 
‘integrate’ the natural sciences into Vedantic metaphysical horizons. The underlying strategy 
in these assimilations of science to Vedantic Hindu universes is to claim that the empirical 
details of the sciences can be illuminated by being absorbed into certain Hindu metaphysical 
perspectives, a claim which leads to the question of whether such incorporations will not 
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generate conceptual conflicts between the two (Brown 2007: 442). When Swami 
Vivekananda (1992: vol.5, 519) claimed, ‘Knowledge is to find unity in the midst of diversity 
– to establish unity amongst things which appear to us to be different from one another’, the 
fundamental question is the kind of unity that is indicated. The Brahma-sūtras, a set of 
foundational aphorisms for all Vedantic systems, begin by stating ‘therefore, then, the inquiry 
into Brahman (the ultimate reality)’ (athāto brahma-jijñāsā). While such a Vedantic inquiry 
is similar in some respects to that of scientists in the fields of, say, astrophysics or quantum 
mechanics, the ultimate reality (Brahman) indicated by the Vedantic traditions is not 
accessible to ordinary reason. Again, while sciences such as physics seek to understand the 
temporal evolution of the cosmos through natural laws, certain forms of Vedānta such as 
Advaita instead view all cosmic processes as ultimately illusory appearances (māyā) out of 
the eternal ground of Brahman. Therefore, since both science and Vedantic systems are, in 
principle, unifying systems of knowledge, the ontological commitments in the ‘unity’ 
proposed by the former may conflict with those in the ‘unity’ projected by the latter. For 
instance, while neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology usually rejects matter-spirit dualisms, 
and argues for consciousness as an emergent property of physical structures, modern 
Vedantic reflections on evolutionary biology regard spirit as (ontologically or logically) 
independent of materiality. Consequently, these Vedantic illuminations of neo-Darwinian 
evolution proceed by redefining the basic terms involved: the Vedantic doctrines are regarded 
as ‘evolutionary’ in the sense that they teach the progressive unfolding of natural phenomena 
under the guardianship of the spirit, whereas Darwinian evolution is said to be anti-spiritual 
and limited only to the biological emergence of the species. Similarly, when Keshub Chunder 
Sen (1901: 405) argued that between God-vision and the spirit of science there was no 
discord, but rather concord because scientists too ‘ardently love unity’, what he had in mind 
was a specific kind of Vedantically-inflected unity of being (1901: 409). Therefore, more 
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recently, after noting certain parallels between concepts in quantum mechanics and classical 
Vedantic metaphysics, V.V. Raman cautiously argues that we should ‘resist the temptation of 
equating interesting conceptual parallels with ontological or epistemological equivalence’ 
(2011: 162). Raman, in fact, argues that Vedanta should be distinguished from science 
because while scientific inquiry is concerned with analysing the empirical details of a 
transient world, Vedanta is aimed at the realisation (anubhava) of the transcendental ground 
of the physical universe (2002: 87).  
 
Science and its European Origins 
 
Our analysis in preceding sections indicates that ‘scientific’ credentials are often claimed for 
the eastern religions on the grounds that they are based on experience, involved in a quest for 
unity, and so on. However, the natural sciences, which too are based on empirical 
observations and often pursue systematic conceptual unification, are also structured by some 
basic concepts and practices such as experimentation, falsification of theories, quantification, 
and so on (Engler 2013: 422).
 Some of these aspects are captured in E.O. Wilson’s definition 
of science as the ‘organized, systematic enterprise that gathers knowledge about the world 
and condenses the knowledge into testable laws and principles’ (1998: 58). We could unpack 
this definition by understanding ‘science’ as a field of activities which is circumscribed by 
certain norms relating to the production, transmission and exchange of knowledge. It is an 
enterprise carried out by individuals (‘scientists’) who are in active communication, meeting 
at conferences or reading one another’s hypotheses in scientific journals. The messages that 
are transmitted among scientists are written in a language which can be understood 
universally, the favored language in many of the sciences being mathematics. The aim of this 
transference is the attainment of the maximal degree of consensus among scientists, who 
20 
 
should be able to reproduce the results proposed by the theory through the design of certain 
experiments carried out under controlled conditions. Through these processes, a ‘paradigm’ 
of inter-related and coherent theories is gradually built up. A scientific paradigm is a web of 
inter-related problems, methods, and practices, and scientists belonging to a certain paradigm 
form a group of communicating enquirers who explore the world in the light of this paradigm 
(Kuhn 1970). To become a scientist an individual has to accept certain statements that she is 
not in a position to immediately test or verify without further training. For example, within 
the Newtonian paradigm, one must first accept the validity of Newton’s three laws of motion, 
and the same applies for other paradigms in the fields of microbiology, cosmology, relativity 
theory and so on (Ziman 1984). Science, in other words, is an ongoing inter-subjective 
process in which messages flow into archives where they can be preserved, understood, 
criticized, (sometimes) verified and (sometimes) falsified by the community of competent 
scientists which is recruiting and training novices. At the same time, one should not 
emphasise a particular set of experimental methods or theoretical principles as necessary 
criteria for a field to be recognised as ‘scientific’ for, as J. Dupre (2004) has pointed out, the 
different scientific disciplines such as physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and so on 
have their specific concepts and methodologies, and there is no single scientific method that 
applies across these fields. Further, the meanings of ‘science’ have shifted, in some ways 
drastically, across the European centuries: thus, in medieval and early modern Europe, 
scientia was understood largely in terms of logical derivations, whereas in the seventeenth 
century ‘natural philosophy’ encompassed our present-day disciplines of astronomy, physics, 
and so on. As P. Harrison (2011: 28) points out, science as a modern academic discipline, 
along with a specific kind of scientific professionals and a general consensus on specific 
themes to be excluded, emerged sometime in the first part of the nineteenth century. 
Languages such as German still do not sharply distinguish between ‘science’ and 
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‘philosophy’, characterising both these academic disciplines and enquiries 
as Wissenschaft (knowledge).  
  
These definitional ambiguities indicate why the supposed connections between theological 
horizons and empirical sciences remain a disputed matter in the literature on the Christian 
roots of science (Sivin 1982: 56). R. Gruner argues that even though it is true that there are 
some continuities between modern science and medieval Christian worldviews, it would be 
incorrect to postulate any historical necessity connecting the former with the latter. He 
criticizes such a necessitarian claim on the grounds that for around 1500 hundred years, 
science did not emerge in Europe, and since the eighteenth century it has often been viewed, 
in fact, as radically opposed to religious doctrine. According to him, the claim that modern 
science has developed from Christianity is ‘at best a very shorthand description of a very 
complex historical event … Science did not grow out of this religion as an oak tree grows out 
of an acorn. For there is nothing natural, predestined, logical about historical development’ 
(Gruner 1975: 81). While accepting that Christian commitment has provided many scientists 
with great stimulus for scientific work, he criticizes the view that such adherence is a 
‘necessary precondition’ for scientific inquiry. More recently, P. Harrison has argued that the 
reason why there were more Protestant than Catholic scientists in early modern Europe is that 
Protestants encouraged believers to read the Bible for themselves in non-allegorical ways and 
without the control of ecclesiastical authorities. This literalist approach to Biblical texts was 
sometimes carried over by them to the study of the world in terms of naturalistic forces and to 
an active engagement with it in the attempt to restore it to its Edenic perfection. Therefore, 
this approach to the texts which was ‘driven by the agenda of the reformers and disseminated 
through Protestant religious practices created the conditions which made possible the 
emergence of modern science’ (Harrison 1998: 266). However, Harrison is careful not to 
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argue that Protestant hermeneutics of the Bible or the Protestant Reformation was the sole 
cause behind the emergence of science, but rather that these played a crucial role in the 
process by promoting certain attitudes and values that intersected with various contingent 
historical forces.  
  
The definitional shifts that we have noted should be kept in mind when one employs the 
vocabulary of ‘Vedic science’, Hinduism or Buddhism as ‘science-friendly’, ‘Vedantic 
science of consciousness’, the ‘meeting’ of Hinduism and science, the ‘scientifically-proven’ 
quality of Buddhism, and so on. R.H. Jones argues in this connection that certain 
comparisons which have been proposed between western scientific methodologies and 
assumptions, on the one hand, and forms of eastern mystical experiences, on the other hand, 
obscure various methodological questions about how the key terms are understood. He notes 
that these juxtapositions are often of these types: ‘“if two systems have some features in 
common, they are identical’” or ‘“if A and B see the world differently than do most people, 
then they see it the same way’” (1986: 172). While certain Vedantic doctrines would indeed 
count as scientific if ‘science’ is understood primarily in terms of a search for conceptual 
unity, a quest for metaphysical foundations, a system of knowledge acquisition that is 
receptive to experiential claims, and so on, these doctrines would sharply conflict with other 
notions associated with contemporary science such as mathematization of natural processes, 
formulation of fallible hypotheses, instrument-based experimentation, and so on. Given that 
science operates with methodological-institutional mechanisms for rejecting certain 
‘traditional’ ways of apprehending the world, a theme that has been intensely debated in 
‘Science Studies’ is whether the denial of a ‘scientific’ status to certain eastern forms of 
‘alternative science’ is a Eurocentric move based on the claim that European science is the 
only universally valid metanarrative. For the proponents of ‘Science Studies’, there is no 
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transcultural essence to the enquiries and practices called science; rather, we should adopt a 
conceptual egalitarianism or conceptual relativism according to which diverse ways of 
configuring our relations to the world are accepted as reasonable and valid. Our concepts of 
space, time, causality, and so on are shaped by our social contexts, and there is thus an 
irreducible plurality of knowledge systems across which there cannot be any translations 
through the principles of logic, rationality, and so on (Brown 2001). All notions of 
universalist logic, truth, rationality, and so on should be rejected because the very appeal to 
such universality is said to be a specifically European hegemonic claim.  
 
Our discussion has indicated that figures such as Swami Vivekananda and the Dalai Lama 
would themselves reject this critique if it were applied to the case of eastern spiritualities: 
they view their specific metaphysical-soteriological claims (the eternity of the Vedantic 
ātman for the former, and Buddhist insight into emptiness for the latter) not as confined to 
Indic or Tibetan horizons but as universally applicable. Further, they have critically 
appropriated at various registers certain aspects of the empirical sciences, which they have 
sought to encompass within their spiritual horizons which are offered as trans-culturally 
valid. Therefore, the critique is usually understood in the field of science and eastern religions 
not as a statement of strong incommensurability which rejects all notions of universality, but 
as an indication that we should welcome alternative eastern epistemic styles as plausible, 
meaningful, and revelatory of aspects of reality, for these styles may be able to integrate 
third-person objective views of the universe into intuitive, meditative, and relational 
worldviews (Dorman 2011: 616). Thus A.N. Balslev argues that ‘the story of science in India 
is not confined only to the two hundred years of assimilation of the Western system of 
knowledge. India has experience with centuries-old knowledge systems that we all need to 
tap into. Some of these knowledge traditions in various domains have been continuously 
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utilized, and some are waiting to be revitalized, as these are seen to be able to provide 
alternatives to the current hegemony of mainstream science’ (2015: 890).  
 
 
Therefore, recent histories of the global circulations of science have critiqued certain 
diffusionist historiographies which present it as a uniquely western configuration that has 
been transmitted to south and southeast Asian peripheries to counter irrational beliefs and 
practices. They have emphasised that science entered into complex negotiations with local 
systems of knowledge, and was adapted in diverse ways into indigenous classifications 
(Arnold 2000). Various forms of modern Buddhisms, with their emphases on experience, 
rationality, and social activism, emerged in contexts of response to and engagement with the 
claims of Christian missionaries and colonial administrators that only western worldviews 
were scientific (Lopez 2010: 890). At the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago 1893, a 
pivotal moment in this narrative, Anagarika Dharmapala subsumed Darwinian evolution and 
the law of cause and effect into the Buddhist teaching of dependent origination (pratītya-
samutpāda), and claimed that western scientific notions had been anticipated by the Buddha. 
He appropriated the western Orientalist presentations of an ideal ‘textual Buddhism’, which 
was carefully distinguished from the ritual practices of ‘living Buddhism’, as well as the 
positive images of the Buddha developed by European figures such as H.S. Olcott of the 
Theosophical movement, both to oppose Christian missions and to revitalise Buddhism 
against the charges that it was nihilistic, pessimistic, and superstitious. Thus, at a talk in New 
York, Dharmapala claimed: ‘The message of the Buddha that I bring to you is free from 
theology, priestcraft, rituals, ceremonies, dogmas, heavens, hells and other theological 
shibboleths. The Buddha taught … a scientific religion containing the highest individualistic 
altruistic ethics, a philosophy of life built on psychological mysticism and a cosmology which 
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is in harmony with geology, astronomy, radioactivity and reality’ (McMahan 2004: 906). 
Olcott himself was a crucial figure in developing the ‘scientific image’ of Buddhism, aligning 
some of the classical Buddhist teachings with contemporary notions such as the law of 
causality. According to his Buddhist Cathecism, which was used in Buddhist Sunday schools 
in Sri Lanka, the state of the future rebirth of an individual is controlled by karmic merit and 
demerit, and the ‘true science’ of evolution ‘entirely supports this doctrine of cause and 
effect. Science teaches that man is the result of a law of development, from an imperfect and 
lower, to a higher and perfect, condition’ (1881: 11). 
 
On some occasions, Dharmapala sought to accentuate the ‘scientific’ status of Buddhism by 
placing it in opposition to ‘Semitic religion’ which is said to lack a scientific foundation: 
‘With the spread of scientific knowledge, Christianity with its unscientific doctrines of 
creator, hell, soul, atonement, will be quite forgotten. With the expansion of knowledge 
Europeans may come to know more of evolution, of the laws of causation, of the changing 
nature of all phenomena … then will Buddhism meet with a sympathetic reception’ 
(McMahan 2004: 923). As D.L. McMahan notes, the early discourse of scientific Buddhism 
was intertwined with the missionary representations of Christianity: on the one hand, the 
reconfigurations of Buddhism drew upon the Protestant emphases on textuality, individual 
experience, and so on, but, on the other hand, these modernized Buddhisms were negations of 
aspects of Christian doctrine which skeptics and liberal Christians had found problematic. 
Thus, Buddhism did not believe in the capricious creation of the world by a personal God, it 
affirmed the universal law of causation, it encouraged individual experimentation rather than 
blind dogma or faith, its doctrine of karma anticipated evolutionary theory, and it had no 
teachings of eternal hell and miraculous interventions (2004: 924–25). The centrality of 
scientific vocabulary has been highlighted also in Japanese Zen which was shaped by 
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Japanese intellectuals such as D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966) who sought to ‘rationalise’ Japanese 
Buddhism, to respond to the Enlightenment critique of institutionalised religion and also to 
the condemnation in the Meiji period (1868–1912) of Buddhism as a corrupt, anti-social, and 
superstitious belief system. The proponents of this New Buddhism claimed that Zen is not a 
religion in the institutional, ritual or clerical senses, but is an ‘uncompromisingly empirical, 
rational, and scientific mode of inquiry into the true nature of things’ (Scharf 1995: 248).  
 
Conclusion  
The application of the label ‘science’ to a knowledge system from an era predating the 
Scientific Revolution, whether in European or non-European locales, turns out to involve 
varying degrees of continuity and discontinuity. G.E.R. Lloyd points out that while there was 
no ‘modern science’ in ancient civilizations such as Mesopotamia, India, or China, they often 
conducted forms of systematic enquiry and accumulated data in various fields such as 
astronomy, medicine, and so on. After noting that these inquiries might be written off as anti-
scientific by contemporary scientists on the charge that they were not structured by causal 
explanations but were grounded in postulated associations between things, he makes the 
following observation: ‘If, in the latter case, many moderns would be tempted to be 
dismissive, we need to be reminded that establishing the similarities between things is an 
essential element in classification and taxonomy in the earth sciences, for example, as well as 
even more obviously in zoology and botany’ (2013: 41). Therefore, the inquiry ‘what is the 
science in eastern religions?’ can also, in effect, assist methodological inquiries in philosophy 
of science into ‘what is science anyway?’ 
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The intellectual developments, in ancient and medieval India, in the fields of astronomy, 
medicine, mathematics, and so on indicate a concern with grounding knowledge claims in 
experience, even if these claims were not tested or falsified in terms of current scientific 
practice involving experimentation, institutionalised peer review, and so on (Subbarayappa 
2011). One should note in this context that the classical Indian standpoint of the Cārvākas 
rejected all beliefs in supernatural entities, and claimed that the universe has evolved through 
the intrinsic causal potencies (svabhāva) of its basic elements. Again, classical Indian 
epistemology was centred around the notion of proof (pramāṇa), and syllogistic patterns of 
reasoning had to proceed by way of supplying evidence in support of the proposed conclusion 
(Ganeri 2001). However, certain forms of modern Vedantic Hinduism, drawing upon 
classical scriptural texts and commentaries, also posit a form of ‘higher’ insight (parā-vidyā), 
which is a non-discursive form of knowledge beyond knowing, and which transcends the 
‘lower’ empirical sciences (aparā-vidyā). At this point the conflict between Vedantic 
knowledge and scientific claims becomes particularly acute, because the latter operate within 
methodological constraints that do not admit trans-empirical entities, states, or processes. For 
an instance of a potential conflict, one can turn to Swami Vivekananda’s proposed 
combination of heredity, which applies at the level of the biological generation of the body 
from parents, with the spiritual processes of the reincarnation of a non-physical self: ‘Our 
theory is heredity coupled with reincarnation’ (Vivekananda 1992: vol.2, 441). While he 
claimed that science is the quest for unity, and that once science reaches ‘perfect unity, it 
would stop from further progress, because it would reach the goal’ (vol.1, 14), the key point 
is the content of the ‘science’ which will have reached complete explanatory scope. 
Therefore, the claim that eastern spiritualities can provide holistic ‘integrations’ of the natural 
sciences can conflict with some of the principles of these sciences, especially if these spiritual 
horizons include vitalism, parapsychology, astrology, and so on, whose scientific status has 
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usually been strongly denied. The debate over the presence or the absence of ‘science’ in 
eastern spiritualities is ultimately a debate over the metaphysical frames – or anti-
metaphysical stances – within which the everyday business of the empirical sciences are 
placed.  
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